Mark D. White

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I’m a professor in the Department of Philosophy at the College of Staten Island/CUNY, where I teach courses in philosophy, economics, and law, and the author/editor/co-editor of several books.

Do we like people as much as we’d like to think?

Mark D. White

Just as Frans de Waal's new book The Age of Empathy comes out (WSJ review here), Robin Hanson (at Overcoming Bias) posts (skeptically, I might add) that new studies show our natural sociality to be limited, especially when it concerns specific persons rather than people in the aggregate. Hansen quotes from a 2007 paper by Dan Ariely et al: "Although people believe that learning more about others leads to greater liking, more information about others leads, on average, to less liking."

Any thoughts, especially from our Smithians?

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2 responses to “Do we like people as much as we’d like to think?”

  1. Jonathan B. Wight Avatar
    Jonathan B. Wight

    Jonathan B. Wight
    Smith’s version of sociability included not only pro-social instincts (e.g., benevolence) but also anti-social instincts (hatred, resentment, and so on).
    Equating “sociability” only with benevolence is too narrow a construct; it omits Smith’s foundation for justice based on the anti-social instincts. If everyone simply felt benevolence, there would be little need for justice.
    So, bottom line is: sociability means more than simply liking others. It also means holding others accountable when they injure you–and punishing them (e.g., in Ultimatum Games) when they do something perceived as unfair. Non-positive emotions are part of “sociability.”
    That said, Smith did feel that proximity could habituate people and allow them more easily to share a positive (or at least neutral) sympathetic space. That is the foundation for affection and adult love.

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  2. Mark D. White Avatar
    Mark D. White

    Thanks, Jonathan – I guess I had a different idea of sociality in mind, sociality as opposed to self-interested, atomistic interaction (which doesn’t necessarily include malevolent action, but may look like it!). Nonetheless, I do appreciate the claaification on Smith’s position – so do you think this work is broadly consistent with Smith’s thought? Would a Smithian approach provide additional (or contradictory) perspective? (I haven’t read the de Waal book – for all I know, he may cite Smith.)

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